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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you and your spouse own a small commercial office building.1  You 
hire a contractor to perform repairs to the building’s exterior.  During the job, an 
employee of the contractor comes in direct contact with an electrical wire and the 
employee is severely injured.  It is later discovered that the equipment the employee 
was using at the time of the accident was not insulated, which contributed to the 
injury.  The employee sues you and the manufacturer of the equipment for his 
injuries and is awarded 2.5 million dollars for his claim.  The jury finds the 
manufacturer of the equipment sixty percent responsible, and you ten percent for 
failing to warn of the wires.  It also finds the plaintiff thirty percent comparatively 
negligent for his own injuries.  Unfortunately, the manufacturer has no insurance 
coverage and files for bankruptcy.  Although your negligence was minimal in 
comparison to the plaintiff and codefendant, the law allows the plaintiff to recover 
seventy percent2 of the entire award from you.  Your insurance pays your policy 
limit of one million and you are required to pay the remaining verdict of $750,000.  
As a result of the economic hardship, you lose your business and your home.  
                                                                
1The fictional scenario was supplied by the author to demonstrate a possible outcome in a 
jurisdiction that applies a pure form of joint and several liability. 
2Seventy percent of the award represents the entire verdict against all defendants less the 
plaintiff’s percentage of negligence.  
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Does this scenario seem fair? Why should you be required to pay seventy percent 
of the verdict when a court of law has found you to be only ten percent responsible?  
More importantly, why should you have to pay the majority of the verdict when the 
plaintiff himself contributed to his injuries to a greater extent than you did?  This is 
an example of what can happen in a jurisdiction that applies a pure form of joint and 
several liability.  It presents an unfair situation where a plaintiff can collect a full 
jury award from one of multiple defendants even though that defendant may be as 
little as one percent responsible.     
The Ohio General Assembly recently passed legislation modifying Ohio’s joint 
and several liability laws in tort actions.3  Prior to this enactment, which took effect 
on April 8, 2003,4 Ohio applied a pure form of joint and several liability in which a 
joint tortfeasor, who is even one percent at fault for a loss, may be obligated to pay 
all economic and non-economic damages to a plaintiff.5  The law now provides for a 
modified form in which joint and several liability is abolished in regard to a 
plaintiff’s non-economic damages.6  Joint and several liability still applies to 
economic damages,7 but only after a threshold percentage of liability is met.8  
Therefore, a plaintiff can only collect the relative percentage of his or her non-
economic damages9 that correspond to the percentage of liability found against that 
defendant.  However, a plaintiff may still be able to collect the entire amount of his 
or her economic damages from a defendant, but only when that defendant is found to 
be more than fifty percent responsible.10  
The outcome of the above mentioned scenario would be different when analyzed 
under Ohio’s new law.  Under Ohio’s modified form of joint and several liability, the 
plaintiff would only be permitted to collect up to ten percent of his economic and 
                                                                
3See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).   
4Id.  
5The Ohio Legislature had previously enacted a modified version of joint and several 
liability as part of the 1996 tort reform package.  See Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 121st Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Ohio 1996).  However, in 1999, the entire tort reform package was eventually ruled 
unconstitutional and Ohio returned to applying joint and several liability in its pure form.  See 
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
6See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).  According to the Ohio 
Revised Code, a “non-economic loss” includes: “[H]arm that results from an injury, death, or 
loss to person that is subject of a tort action, including, but not limited to, pain and suffering; 
loss of society, consortium, companionship, care assistance, counsel, instruction, training, or 
education; mental anguish, and any other intangible loss.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.011 
(C) (F) (West Supp. 2003). 
7See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).  According to the Ohio 
Revised Code, an “economic loss” includes: “All wages, salaries, or other compensation lost 
as a result of an injury, death, or loss to a person or property that is a subject of a tort action. .. 
All expenditures for medical care or treatment, rehabilitation services . . . . Any other 
expenditures incurred as a result of an injury, death, or loss to person or property that is a 
subject of a tort action.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.011 (C) (F) (West Supp. 2003). 
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non-economic damages from you, representing the percentage for which the jury 
found you liable.  However, had the jury found you or any collectable defendant to 
be more than fifty percent responsible, joint and several liability would be applicable 
to you or that defendant, but only in regard to the plaintiff’s economic damages.11
This Note contends that if Ohio insists on retaining some form of joint and 
several liability, the recently adopted modified version is a desirable alternative to 
returning to the pure form.12  As compared to the pure form, the modified version 
promotes a more balanced tort system and represents a fair compromise to the 
competing interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.  Part II of this Note reviews the 
history of joint and several liability and examines Ohio’s application of this legal 
doctrine.  Part III looks at prior constitutional challenges to various tort reform 
measures, and analyzes these challenges in light of Ohio’s new law.  It presents the 
likely parallel attacks against the constitutionality of the modified form of joint and 
several liability and provides insights as to how the new law will pass constitutional 
muster in the face of such challenges.  Part IV examines policy arguments against a 
pure form of joint and several liability.  It demonstrates how, as compared to the pure 
form, Ohio’s new joint and several liability laws are more in accord with 
comparative negligence standards and how they help foster a growing economy.  
Finally, Part V concludes by advocating for the modified form of joint and several 
liability and proposes that Ohio’s new laws will minimize the disparities and 
inadequacies that exist when joint and several liability is applied in its pure form.13
II.  HISTORY OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY DOCTRINE 
A.  Its Origin 
Joint and several liability arises when multiple defendants are found liable for the 
same tort.14  It comes into play when one defendant is found partially liable and there 
are other culpable parties who are unavailable, uninsured, insolvent, or not sued.15  
The doctrine originally was applied at English common law in cases where multiple 
                                                                
11The fictional scenario was supplied by the author to demonstrate the difference in 
outcomes when applying a pure form of joint and several liability versus applying Ohio’s new 
modified form.  Other states have totally done away with joint and several liability and make 
no distinction between economic and non-economic damages.  If this were the case in this 
scenario, no matter what percentage the defendant was faulted to pay, that defendant would 
only have to pay the corresponding percentage of both the plaintiff’s economic and non-
economic damages.  
12Along with defending the modified form of joint and several liability, the author will 
also discuss points in favor of abolishing joint and several liability all together.  However, a 
detailed argument in favor of total abolishment of joint and several liability is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
13Although this Note mentions various tort reform measures, it will not attempt to go into 
depth on the fairness or constitutionality of other reform provisions.  The author will primarily 
focus on joint and several liability laws. 
14See Paul Bargren, Joint and Several Liability: Protection for Plaintiffs, 1994 WIS. L. 
REV. 453 (1994) (detailing historical and background information pertaining to joint and 
several liability).  
15Id.  
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defendants acted “in concert”16 or breached a common duty.17  Joint and several 
liability was later extended in the United States to apply to concurrent torts where 
multiple defendants committed independent torts that caused one indivisible injury to 
a plaintiff, regardless of a “concert of action.”18  The rationale for allowing a plaintiff 
to recover one hundred percent of his or her injuries from one defendant was based 
on practicality.19  The modern form of joint and several liability allows that “two or 
more tortfeasors may be subject to liability for the same harm and may be sued by 
the plaintiff, together or separately.”20  A plaintiff can recover once, either 
completely from one of the tortfeasors, or in part from each.21  Therefore, a 
defendant can be held jointly or severally liable for an injury in which his negligence 
was a proximate cause, and just because another tortfeasor is immune from suit does 
not relieve him of his liability for a plaintiff’s indivisible injury.22  This occurs 
irrespective of the percentage of fault found against that defendant.23
There are competing opinions about the fairness of joint and several liability as 
well as compelling arguments for both sides.  Supporters of the joint and several 
liability doctrine argue that it upholds the compensatory goal of our tort system by 
allowing plaintiffs to be fully and adequately made whole.24  Supporters also argue 
that defendants are in a better position of bearing and spreading the cost of 
unavailable defendants’ liability than injured plaintiffs, and that abolishing this rule 
would shield responsible defendants while preventing innocent plaintiffs from being 
fully compensated.25    
Opponents of the doctrine propose that a pure form of joint and several liability 
weakens the deterrence goal of our tort system by placing full responsibility on a 
single defendant, even though that defendant took reasonable means to prevent 
injury to the plaintiff.26  Others argue that joint and several liability encourages 
abusive litigation practices because it allows plaintiffs to sue any defendant who may 
be only marginally responsible, yet able to pay the full verdict in the event the 
plaintiff is able to establish merely one percent liability against them.27  Therefore, a 
                                                                
16Also referred to as a “shared tort,” where multiple tortfeasors act together in breaching 
one common duty, causing injury to a plaintiff.  Id. at 455.  
17Id.; see also Han-Duck Lee, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Tort Reforms on the 
Rate of Tort Filings 28 (1992).  
18Bargen, supra note 14, at 455; Lee, supra note 17, at 29.  
19See Frank J. Vandall, Articles: A Critique of the Restatement (Third), Apportionment as 
it Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565, 566 (2000).  
20VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 741 (Carolina 




24Lee, supra note 17, at 29. 
25Id. at 29-30. 
26Id. at 30. 
27Id.  
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“deep pocket” defendant who has minimal liability may be hit hard in order to 
compensate for other negligent defendants who are unable to pay their share.28  Also, 
joint and several liability arguably increases litigation costs because each party must 
pay defense costs in order to prove their proper share of liability among multiple 
defendants.29  Finally, some opponents believe that, in jurisdictions that apply joint 
and several liability, the uncertainty in the outcome of trials is increased, thus 
reducing insurance availability and increasing insurance costs.30   
Although, under certain circumstances, there are persuasive arguments to apply 
joint and several liability, these arguments are far outweighed by the need to limit or 
abolish joint and several liability, as illustrated by viewing the history of the doctrine 
and the unfairness that it has presented in our legal system. 
B.  In Ohio 
There has been an ongoing battle in Ohio since the late 1980’s between the 
General Assembly and the Ohio Supreme Court over various tort reform issues.31  
Ohio’s Senate and House of Representatives passed a massive tort reform bill, which 
was signed into law by former Governor George Voinovich on October 28, 1996, 
and took effect on January 27, 1997.32  This comprehensive bill contained numerous 
provisions affecting the access to judicial relief including limitations on non-
economic and punitive damage awards; a medical claims statute of repose, product 
liability and improvements to real property; offsets for collateral benefits; and 
modification of joint and several liability.33  Like the recent enactment of Am. Sub. 
S.B. 120,34 the 1996 tort reform Act applied a modified version of joint and several 
liability by abrogating it for non-economic damages and applying it for economic 
damages, but only when a defendant is found to be more than fifty percent at fault.35   
The constitutionality of the 1996 reform effort was challenged on November 20, 
1997, when the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers and the AFL-CIO filed suit against 
six Ohio Court of Common Pleas judges.36  By 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court struck 
down the entire bill in its ruling in State ex rel. Ohio Acad. Of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward.37  The court held the bill unconstitutional in toto38 and found that the 
                                                                
28Id.  
29Lee, supra note 17, at 30. 
30Id. at 30-31. 
31See Jonathon Tracy, Ohio ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward: The End 
Must Justify the Means, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 883 (2000).  
32See Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996). 
33Id.  
34See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003). 
35See Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996). 
36See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1068 (Ohio 
1999).   
37Id.  The date of the ruling was August 16, 1999.  Id.  
38Id. at 1111.  
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legislature’s enactment violated judicial authority.39  The court found that the 
plaintiffs had standing to bring the action,40 and the main thrust of the court’s 
decision was that the bill violated the one-subject rule of Ohio’s Constitution.41  The 
court also reviewed the constitutionality of only seven of the one hundred provisions 
within the bill.  These provisions were discussed in light of state constitutional rights 
of equal protection, due process, and the right to trial by jury.42
After the ruling in Sheward, Ohio returned to applying a pure form of joint and 
several liability43up until the recent 2003 enactment when the Ohio rules governing 
contributory fault and joint and several liability were again revised.44  Because of the 
recent enactment, existing Ohio statutes involving joint and several liability, 
contribution, contributory negligence, and assumption of risks were repealed,45and 
many new statutes were added.46  Ohio’s new law brings back the modified form of 
joint and several liability.  A defendant now can be held jointly and severally liable 
for a loss with respect to only economic damages, and the rule applies only to the 
defendant who is: (a) found to be more than fifty percent liable for a plaintiff’s injury 
or loss,47 or (b) found to have committed an intentional tort.48  For non-economic 
damages, a liable defendant is now made to pay only his proportionate share, no 
matter what percentage of negligence is allocated to him.49  Therefore, if a defendant 
is found fifty percent or less responsible he or she is only required to pay the 
corresponding percentage of both economic and non-economic damages. 
Ohio’s new laws require that the trier of fact specify the percentage of tortious 
conduct attributable to: (a) the plaintiff; (b) the defendants from whom plaintiff is 
seeking recovery; and (c) parties from whom the plaintiff is not seeking recovery.50 
                                                                
39Id. at 1105-06.   
40Id. at 1084-85. 
41Id. at 1111. The Ohio Constitution states that, “[N]o bill shall contain more than one 
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”  OHIO CONST. art. II § 15(d).  See State ex 
rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994).  
42See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062; OHIO CONST. art. I §§ 2, 5, 16.  
43See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062. 
44See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003).   
45OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31-2307.33, 2315.19, 2315.20 (West Supp. 2003). 
46Id. §§ 2307.22-2307.23, 2315.42-2315.46, 2307.25-2307.28. 
47Id. § 2307.22 (a)(1). 
48Id. § 2307.22 (a)(3). 
49Id. § 2307.22 (c). 
50Id. § 2307.23.   
The bill states:   
(A) In determining the percentage of tortious conduct attributable to a party in a tort 
action . . . the court in a nonjury action shall make findings of fact, and the jury in a 
jury action shall return a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, 
that shall specify all of the following: (1) The percentage of tortuous conduct that 
proximately caused the injury or loss to person or property or the wrongful death that 
is attributable to the plaintiff and to each party to the tort action from whom the 
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This is a major change from the prior law, which precluded evidence involving a 
non-named party and limited findings of negligence only against the parties before 
the court.  The sum of the tortious conduct so determined must equal one hundred 
percent.51  Ohio now also permits defendants to use the plaintiff’s comparative fault 
as a defense to product liability actions.52  This is true only as to an affirmative 
defense to contributory negligence, whereas express or implied assumption of risk 
remains a complete bar to recovery.53  Furthermore, the new laws provide for a right 
of contribution54 for defendants found jointly and severally liable as well as those 
defendants who were not a party to the original lawsuit.55   
Although under the pure form of joint and several liability plaintiffs were more 
likely to receive full compensation, it was often at the expense of a victim defendant 
who was pulled into litigation for the sole purpose of satisfying a large verdict.56  
Thus, Ohio’s modified joint and several liability laws are more fair than the 
                                                          
plaintiff seeks recovery in this action; (2) The percentage of tortuous conduct that 
proximately caused the injury or loss to person or property or the wrongful death that 
is attributable to each person from whom the plaintiff does not seek recovery from this 
action.   
Id.  
51Id.  The statute states, “[t]he sum of the percentages of tortious conduct as determined 
pursuant to division (A) of this section shall equal one hundred per cent.”  Id.  
52Id. §§ 2315.42-2315.43.  The bill states: 
Contributory negligence or other contributory tortious conduct may be asserted as an 
affirmative defense to a product liability claim.  Contributory negligence or other 
contributory tortious conduct of a plaintiff does not bar the plaintiff from recovering 
damages that have directly and proximately resulted from the tortious conduct of one 
or more other persons, if the contributory negligence or other contributory tortious 
conduct of the plaintiff was not greater then the combined tortious conduct of all other 
persons from whom the plaintiff seeks recovery and of all other persons from whom 
the plaintiff does not seek recovery in this action.   
Id.  
53Id. §§ 2315.42(b).  The bill states: 
If express or implied assumption of the risk is asserted as an affirmative defense to a 
product liability claim and if it is determined that the plaintiff expressly or impliedly 
assumed a risk and that the express or implied assumption of the risk was a direct and 
proximate cause of harm for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages, the express 
or implied assumption of the risk is a complete bar to the recovery of those damages.  
Id.  
54The bill states:   
If one or more persons are jointly and severally liable in tort for the same injury or 
loss…there may be a right of contribution even though judgment has not been 
recovered against all or any of them.  The right of contribution exists only in favor of a 
tortfeasor who has paid more than that tortfeasor’s proportionate share of the common 
liability, and that tortfeasor’s total recovery is limited to the amount paid by that 
tortfeasor in excess of that tortfeasor’s proportionate share.   
Id. § 2307.25(a).  
55Id. § 2307.225. 
56Pat O’Callahan, Sticker Shock: Torts and Retorts; Physicians Work to Limit Malpractice 
Awards While Plaintiff’s Attorneys Defend, THE NEWS TRIB., Jan. 18, 2004, at B08.  
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previously applied pure form because they do not subject defendants to pay for non-
economic damages in which they are not responsible, yet the laws still allow 
plaintiffs to recover in full for their out-of-pocket expenses.57
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO VARIOUS TORT REFORM MEASURES 
The Ohio Supreme Court has taken an active role in tort reform legislation over 
the past two decades by striking down tort reform provisions based on allegations of 
constitutional infringements.58  Although the constitutionality of the modified form 
of joint and several liability was not specifically discussed in Sheward,59 it will, 
undoubtedly be challenged at some point.    
In Sheward, the plaintiffs claimed that several portions of the 1996 tort reform 
bill violated certain provisions of the Ohio Constitution.60  Because case law existed, 
which had previously struck down certain provisions of the bill, the General 
Assembly allegedly tried to usurp the court’s constitutional authority by violating the 
separation of powers provisions of the Ohio Constitution in not recognizing prior 
holdings of the court.61  Ohio case law, however, is scarce in specifically analyzing 
the constitutionality of a modified form of joint and several liability.  Therefore, the 
separation of powers approach is not likely to be the approach used in any future 
attacks on Ohio’s current joint and several liability laws.   
Ohio’s new law should survive constitutional attack under the “single subject” 
rule, which only allows an act to be brought forth under one subject.62  The majority 
in Sheward found that the 1996 tort reform Act covered a multitude of subjects that 
included “eighteen different titles, thirty-eight different chapters, and over one 
hundred different sections of the Revised Code.”63  The test used by the court was to 
determine whether the topics “share a common purpose or relationship.”64  The court 
found that the Act did not meet this threshold, therefore it did not comply with the 
                                                                
57“The notion that someone can be as little as one percent at fault but yet made to pay [one 
hundred] percent of costs defies any common sense of fairness.  Ohio must join 33 states who 
have reformed their joint and several liability laws to reflect proportionate liability.”  
Regarding Apportionment of Liability in Civil Actions.  Second Hearing on SB 120 Before the 
House Civil & Commercial Law Committee (2002) (statement of Ty Pine, National Federation 
of Independent Businesses), at http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/oh_ban_124%3ASB 
120.notes (last visited February 2004). 
58See Stephen J. Werber, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law: Ohio Tort Reform 
Versus the Ohio Constitution, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1155-57 (1996); Tracy, supra note 31, at 833. 
59See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062.  
60Id. 
61Id. 
62Id. at 1098. 
63Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1099. 
64Id.  The court looked to see whether the topics of the Act “unite to form a single subject” 
and did not find this to be the case.  Id.  It stated that, “Am. Sub. H.B. No. 350 attempts to 
combine the wearing of seat belts with employment discrimination claims, class actions 
arising from the sale of securities . . . recall notifications, . . . [to] actions by a roller skater 
with supporting affidavits in a medical claim . . . and so on.” Id. at 1100.  
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“single-subject” rule.65  Ohio’s General Assembly however, brought forth Ohio’s 
current legislation under a single subject, discussing only joint and several liability 
and related doctrines of liability apportionment.66  Therefore, because Ohio’s recent 
enactment deals with only one subject, it should not be found to violate the “single-
subject” rule. 
The modified form of joint and several liability passes the “single-subject” test, 
thus is not, in itself, unconstitutional.  Had it not been for the “sledgehammer”67 
effect in Sheward, the provision modifying joint and several liability would have 
withstood constitutional scrutiny.  The Sheward court even noted that it only 
addressed a few of the provisions in the 1996 reform bill, and they considered their 
review of a few provisions in that bill68 to be limited and “not to be construed as 
either a rejection or acceptance of those claims not herein considered.” 69  Prior to 
Sheward, one commentator stated, “[T]he only proposals [of the 1996 tort reform 
bill] that are truly oppressive and worthy of constitutional attack are those relating to 
the statutes of repose, and, perhaps, the ceilings on non-economic loss and punitive 
damages.”70  In 2000, another author stated: “[A] significant number of provisions 
[in the 1996 tort reform bill] most likely would have survived constitutional 
scrutiny.”71    
The next section of this Note analyzes three provisions of the Ohio Constitution 
that have been utilized in challenging various tort reform measures in Ohio as well as 
other states.  These provisions are: the right to trial by jury, equal protection of the 
law, and the right to due process.  Arguments used in these prior attacks will be 
examined as possible rationale for future attacks on Ohio’s modified joint and 
several liability laws.  The Note presents arguments to show how the new law will 
withstand such attacks.72    
                                                                
65See generally Sheward. 
66See Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003). 
67Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform Versus State Constitutional 
Mandates, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 4 1045, 1061 (2001).  Werber concedes that although there were 
certain provisions in the 1996 Tort Reform Act that were unconstitutional, not a single section 
ever took effect.  Id.  He states that, “This sledgehammer approach, however, leaves the door 
open to a well-crafted series of Acts that could force the court to address each on its own 
constitutional merit . . . [and] [m]any provisions [of the Tort Reform Act], if enacted within 
the confines of a single subject, should pass constitutional muster.”  Id.  
68Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1102. 
69Id. 
70Werber, supra note 58, at 1158.   
71Recent Cases: State Tort Reform-Ohio Supreme Court Strikes Down State General 
Assembly’s Tort Reform Initiative, 113 HARV. L. REV. 804 (2004).   
72There is little Ohio case law in existence that discusses the constitutionality of abolishing 
or modifying joint and several liability. Therefore, the author will pull from other states’ case 
law as well as other tort reform measures previously challenged in Ohio to support the 
author’s contentions. 
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A.  The Right to Trial by Jury 
When joint and several liability is applied, thereby increasing the liability of a 
defendant above the percentage allocated by the fact finder, that defendant has 
arguably been denied his or her right to trial by jury.  Challenges to Ohio’s modified 
joint and several liability laws may attempt to look to The Right to Trial clause of 
Ohio’s Constitution if attempts to bring back the pure form are made.  The Ohio 
Constitution states, “[T]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate . . . .”73  This means 
that the right to trial by jury cannot be denied to any party involved in civil tort 
litigation.  This right is “fundamental, substantive, and included within it, ‘is the 
right to have a jury determine all questions of fact, including the amount of damages 
to which the plaintiff is entitled.’”74  This fundamental right of trial by jury clearly 
supports total abolition of joint and several liability.  Therefore, arguing a 
defendant’s right to trial would be even more persuasive in defending the modified 
form of joint and several liability.   
Those who oppose a modified form of joint and several liability75 may attempt to 
use similar constitutional arguments, to those previously used in challenging general 
or non-economic damage caps, in attempts to bring back the pure form.  In looking at 
general damage caps, limiting recovery to $200,000,76 the Sheward court looked at 
previous Ohio cases and interpreted them to hold that caps on general damages were 
unconstitutional because the right to trial by jury includes the right to have the jury 
determine the amount of damages to be awarded.77  Challengers may claim that 
abolishing joint and several liability for non-economic damages limits the damages 
owed to an injured plaintiff and is equivalent to placing a cap on a plaintiff’s general 
damages.  However, returning to a pure form violates the defendant’s parallel right to 
trial by jury.78  
                                                                
73OHIO CONST. art. I § 5. 
74Werber, supra note 58, at 1191 (quoting Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., 644, N.E.2d 298, 
301 (Ohio 1994)) (holding that a statute that allowed periodic payments of judgments violated 
the right to trial by jury because this reduced the value of the award determined by the jury).  
Werber also refers to another Ohio case in support of this argument: Jeanne v. Hawkes Hosp. 
of Mt. Carmel, 598 N.E.2d 1174, 1180 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (reiterating that the right to a jury 
trial is a substantive right which may not be abridged).  Id.  
75The author is referring to those who oppose the modified form of joint and several 
liability as those who wish to retain the pure form.  However, not all persons who oppose the 
modified form of joint and several liability wish to bring back the pure form.  Some opponents 
to the modified form feel that joint and several liability should be totally abolished.  Therefore, 
those who argue total abolition may not support the modified version constitutionally and may 
want to strike down the modified version as a way to gain total abolition.  
76See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1091 (Ohio 
1999).   
77Id. at 1092. The court reviewed the rulings of Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 
1991) (finding limits to general damage awards violated the due course of law provision of the 
Ohio Constitution).  See id. at 1091-92; see also OHIO CONST. art. I § 16. 
78Abolishing joint and several liability for both economic and non-economic damages 
adds even more support to this counter argument.  
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According to Justice Sweeney in Morris v. Savoy, “inviolate,” means “free from 
substantial impairment.”79  This provision does not distinguish between plaintiffs and 
defendants.80  Justice Sweeney acknowledged that included within the right to trial 
by jury is not only the right to have a jury determine issues of fact, but also to assess 
the damages.81  One Ohio scholar agrees with this reasoning and contends82 that 
when joint and several liability is applied, and a defendant is made to pay more than 
his proportionate share of the damages allocated by a jury, his or her right to trial by 
jury is violated.83  Changing the percentage established by a jury as to how much that 
defendant is to pay, in effect, changes the jury verdict.84   
There exists an equally strong argument to retaining Ohio’s modified form of 
joint and several liability if attempts are made to return to the pure form.  “Just as a 
cap cannot constitutionally lower a jury determination, a rule that increases that 
determination as to any party cannot withstand identical constitutional scrutiny.”85  
In applying joint and several liability to an entire jury award against only one of 
multiple co-defendants, the verdict against that one defendant becomes severely 
altered.86  These arguments show strong support for retaining the modified form of 
joint and several liability, and if challenged under Ohio’s Right to Trial by Jury 
provision, the new joint and several liability laws should be upheld. 
B.  Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause of Ohio’s Constitution87 may also be looked to if 
Ohio’s Ohio’s joint and several liability laws are challenged.  It states:  
All political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, 
or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special 
privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, 
revoked, or repealed by the General Assembly.88   
                                                                
79See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 779 (Ohio 1991). 
80Werber, supra note 58, at 1192. “If the jury determines that defendant “A” owes 60% of 
a $100,000 economic loss, the legislature has no right to increase the obligation from $60,000 
to $100,000 no matter how laudable its objectives.  What the General Assembly has not 
recognized is that defendants, not just plaintiffs, have a vested right in jury verdicts.”  Id.  
81Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 779. 
82Stephen J. Werber, Remarks at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Faculty Speaker 
Series, Tort Reform: State and Federal Constitutional Concerns (Nov. 19, 2003).  
83Id.  
84Id.  
85Werber, supra note 67, at 1069. 
86A jury verdict against one of multiple co-defendants is less altered with the modified 
form of joint and several liability because it only applies to economic damage. Therefore, a 
verdict would be altered even less and would be more consistent with the juror’s intentions if 
joint and several liability is not applied at all. 
87OHIO CONST. art. I § 2. 
88Id.  
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Equal protection arguments usually involve allegations that a person or persons 
who fall under a certain statutory classification are denied a right that others, who are 
similarly situated, are not.89  In looking at the Equal Protection Clause to determine 
whether a statutory classification is constitutional, courts apply one of three levels of 
scrutiny.90  The first and least stringent form is the “rational basis” test, which looks 
to see whether the classification created by the statute has some reasonable 
relationship to a legitimate legislative objective.91  The second, is categorized as an 
intermediate test often called the “heightened scrutiny” or “means-end scrutiny” test, 
which looks to determine whether a classification “substantially furthers a legitimate 
legislative purpose.”92  The third and most rigorous level is the “strict scrutiny” test, 
which determines whether the classification is narrowly tailored and necessary to 
meet a compelling state interest.93  The rational basis test is the standard that most 
tort reform laws are and should be judged under.94   
In Morris, the Supreme Court of Ohio applied the appropriate “rational basis” 
test to determine whether an Ohio statute, which placed a cap of $200,000 on general 
damage awards in medical malpractice claims, was constitutional.95  The Court 
declared that in challenging the constitutionality of a law under the Equal Protection 
Clause, one must demonstrate that either: (a) there was no rational basis for the 
creation of the class itself, or (b) that the people within the class were being treated 
unfairly in furthering the legitimate governmental interest.96  Although the court 
found a distinction in treatment between those within and those outside the class, the 
court failed to find the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.97  In 
applying the “rational basis” test, the court declared that it would uphold a statutory 
classification as long as the classification is rationally related to a legitimate 
                                                                
89Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Kan. 1991).  
90Id.   
91Id. The “rational basis” test only subjects a statute to “minimal scrutiny and will be 
upheld so long as the classifications made are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”  
Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, slip op. at 8 (Tex. Filed Sept. 21, 1988) (Phillips, T., 
dissenting). 
92Id.  This test is also referred to as the middle-tier, or “means scrutiny” and “is applied 
when a statute burdens a sensitive, but not a suspect, class or impinges on an important, but 
not a fundamental, right.”  Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, slip op. at 7-8 (Tex. Filed 
Sept. 21, 1988) (Phillips, T., dissenting) (claiming that the non-economic cap on damages did 
not violate any provision of the Texas Constitution and, furthermore, that the “cap operates to 
limit the liability of each defendant rather than the recovery of the plaintiff”).  Id. at 1.  
93Id. at 7-8 (Phillips, J., dissenting).  The “strict scrutiny” test is normally applied to laws 
that “burdens an inherently suspect class or affects a fundamental liberty right.”  Id. at 7 
(Phillips, J., dissenting). 
94Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, slip op. at 12 (Tex. filed Sept. 21, 1988) 
(Phillips, J., dissenting).  
95Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991). 
96Id.  
97Id. at 772. 
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governmental purpose.98  However, it stated that it is up to the legislature to decide 
whether a statute is constitutional and that the court “does not inquire whether…[the] 
statute is wise or desirable.”99  Therefore, based on the Morris decision, the Equal 
Protection Clause isn’t likely to support a successful challenge to Ohio’s modified 
joint and several liability laws. 
Case law from other states will assist in defending the constitutionality of Ohio’s 
modified form of joint and several liability.  For instance, an Arizona Court of 
Appeals also applied the “rational basis” test in Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry 
Co.100 to uphold an Arizona statute, which abolished joint and several liability.101  
The case arose out of an injury that the plaintiff sustained while unloading containers 
of merchandise at work.102  She sued the distributor, Rawson, alleging its employees 
had negligently stacked the merchandise on pallets, which caused the containers to 
fall on her.103  The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her 
$52,625.50.104  The jury apportioned fault equally among the plaintiff, her employer 
and Rawson.  However, because an Arizona statute made her employer immune 
from suit due to the fact that the plaintiff had already received workers’ 
compensation benefits, the plaintiff was only allowed to collect one-third of her 
damages from Rawson, amounting to $17,541.83.105  At the time of this lawsuit, 
Arizona’s joint and several liability statute stated that each defendant could be held 
liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant, and that joint and 
several liability is to be applied only when two defendants are acting in concert, 
“when one party is an agent of another, or when a cause of action relates to 
hazardous wastes or substances.”106   
The plaintiff argued that doing away with joint and several liability denied her 
equal protection under Arizona’s Constitution because the law discriminated against 
certain classes of plaintiffs.107  She argued that without joint and several liability, 
some plaintiffs would not receive full recovery when the defendants are insolvent or 
immune from suit, while other plaintiffs who file suit against able-paying defendants, 
would receive full recovery.108  The court rejected these arguments, and found that 
the statute met the rational basis test.109  The court stated that laws will be deemed 
                                                                
98Id. at 781. 
99Id. at 772. 
100Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., No. 1 CA-CV 90-0357, 1992 Ariz. App. LEXIS 
276, at *344 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1992). 
101Id.  
102Id. at *344. 
103Id.  
104Id.  
105Id. at *344-55. 
106Id. at *345. 
107Id. at *348. 
108Id. at *351. 
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constitutional and legislation will be upheld when the statute is found to be rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose.”110  
If judicial attempts to bring back a pure form of joint and several liability are 
made in Ohio, challengers of Ohio’s current joint and several liability laws will 
likely use a similar approach as the plaintiff in Church by claiming that without 
applying a pure form of joint and several liability, plaintiffs who have no choice but 
to sue insolvent or uncollectible defendants will be treated differently than similarly 
situated plaintiffs who are able to sue able-paying defendants.  Arguably, the 
treatment will be different, in that one class of plaintiffs will be able to collect the 
entire verdict,111 while another class will not.112  However, as in Church, Ohio’s 
legislative enactment will also be upheld under “rational basis” scrutiny and the 
same reasoning that the Church court used in evaluating Arizona’s statute in 
abolishing joint and several liability will also be applicable to Ohio’s laws, which 
only partially abolishes joint and several liability.  
C.  Due Process 
As previously expressed, future challenges to Ohio’s modified joint and several 
liability laws may look to Morris in trying to bring back the pure form of joint and 
several liability.  The “due course of law” provision of the Ohio Constitution is 
considered to be the equivalent of the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.113  It states, “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury 
done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay . . . .”114  The 
review of due process claims is similar to that of equal protection claims.115  “The 
                                                          
109Id. at *350.  The Church court held that in looking at The Equal Protection Clause, the 
correct standard of review was the rational basis test.  Id.  The court also relied on language by 
the Supreme Court of Kansas in a 1978 case, which commented on the abolition of joint and 
several liability in stating, “[T]here is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at 
fault paying 100% of the loss, and there is no social policy that should compel defendants to 
pay more than their fair share of the loss.  Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find them.”  
Id. (citing Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978)).   
110Id.  It can be argued that the General Assembly’s purpose in modifying Ohio’s joint and 
several liability laws are likely to be similar to that of the Arizona’s legislature.  Therefore, if 
challenges are made to change Ohio’s joint and several liability laws, Ohio’s courts will most 
likely find that Ohio’s joint and several liability laws, in creating two classifications, serve a 
legitimate government purpose and are rationally related to that purpose. 
111Under a pure form of joint and several liability, a classification of plaintiffs are created 
who can collect an entire full verdict from any able paying defendant, who is at least one 
percent responsible, for both economic and non-economic damages.  
112Under the current, modified form of joint and several liability, another classification of 
plaintiffs are created who can only collect from an able paying defendant for the full cost of 
economic damages, but only if that defendant is more than fifty percent at fault.  In regards to 
non-economic damages, those plaintiffs can only collect that portion of the verdict that the 
defendant is responsible for.  
113Id. at 780. 
114OHIO CONST. art. I § 16. 
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Due Process Clause protects liberty and property interests while the Equal Protection 
Clause protects against discriminatory classifications.”116   
Though the majority in Morris found the Act that limited general damages did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause, it did find it to violate Ohio’s Due Process 
Clause.117  The court observed that the Act was created with the legislative intent of 
reducing rising medical malpractice insurance rates, but it found no evidence to show 
a rational relationship between malpractice insurance rates and general damage 
awards over $200,000.118  The court found it to be unconstitutional because the law 
did not “bear a real and substantial relation to public health or welfare and further 
because it is unreasonable and arbitrary” to impose the cost of the legislature’s 
intended outcome on those “most severely injured by medical malpractice.”119   
Although Morris found general damage caps in medical malpractice cases to 
violate Ohio’s Due Process Clause, the Church court did not find that an Arizona 
statute, which abolished joint and several liability, infringed upon its state’s Due 
Process Clause.120  The Church court noted three objectives that the Arizona 
legislature had in mind when creating a statute that abolished joint and several 
liability.121  The court determined that the legislature’s purpose in abrogating joint 
and several liability was based on the following reasons: (a) it was consistent with 
the state’s pure comparative negligence standards in which a plaintiff’s recovery is 
reduced by the degree of fault that the plaintiff contributed to his or her own injury; 
(b) it was “more fair to impose liability according to fault, rather than to have one 
who is marginally at fault pay all of the damages”; and (c) by protecting defendants 
from paying more than their share of fault, implementation of the statute is an 
attempt to “alleviate a perceived crisis caused by rising insurance rates.”122  
The plaintiff argued that the statute abolishing joint and several liability did not 
further the legislature’s interest in a rational way and that the statute did not allow for 
a fair apportionment of liability.123  Although the court recognized the plaintiff’s 
argument that there may be other ways of “achieving the goal of fairness in this 
area,” it did not agree that the method the legislature used was irrational.124  The 
court found that even if there are some differences in the classifications created by a 
statute, “it is not unconstitutional if it rests on some reasonable basis.”125  Therefore, 
                                                          
115Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., No. 1 CA-CV 90-0357, 1992 Ariz. App. LEXIS 
276, at *348 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1992).  
116Id.  
117Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 691, 772 (Ohio 1991). 
118Id. at 770. 
119Id. at 771. 
120Church, 1992 Ariz. App. LEXIS 276, at *344.    
121Id. at *350. 
122Id. 
123Id.  
124Id. at *350-51. 
125Id.  
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it was determined that the statute abolishing joint and several liability did bear a 
rational relationship to the legislature’s intent and the law was upheld.126   
It is likely that Ohio’s purpose in enacting the current legislation is conceivably 
the same or, at least, similar to that of the Arizona legislature in Church.  Therefore, 
if the Church court found that the statute abolishing joint and several liability was 
constitutional under the Due Process Clause, any challenges to Ohio’s modified joint 
and several liablity laws should also be upheld under the Due Process Clause 
because the classifications created by Ohio’s laws are rationally related to the Ohio 
General Assembly’s intent. 
Challenges to legislation are not just grounded in case law and constitutional 
attacks.  Public policy and fairness arguments are both highly effective approaches 
used in challenging and defending laws. The next two sections examine joint and 
several liability laws in modern day society and conclude that the doctrine is not 
conducive to our modern day judicial system.  
IV.  POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST A PURE FORM OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
A.  Joint and Several Liability in a Comparative Fault System 
The doctrine of joint and several liability does not comport with current Ohio 
comparative fault standards.127  The fairness arguments that formed the rationale 
behind abandoning contributory negligence standards serve as the same arguments 
for abandoning the pure form of joint and several liability.128  According to one 
commentator, “The very basis of comparative negligence is that the relative fault of 
individual actors can be determined and that each actor should be held responsible 
for that degree of fault.”129  It is just as unfair for a plaintiff who is five percent at 
fault to recover nothing as it is for a defendant who is five percent at fault to pay the 
entire verdict, especially when the plaintiff’s liability is greater than that of the 
defendant.130   
At early common law, the doctrine of contributory negligence was a complete bar 
to recovery when plaintiffs were found negligent for their own injuries, even if that 
negligence was slight as compared to that of the defendants.131  Eventually, due to 
the harshness of contributory negligence, courts have since moved to a comparative 
                                                                
126See id.  
127“The contributory fault of a person does not bar the person as plaintiff from recovering 
damages that have directly and proximately resulted from the tortious conduct of one or more 
other persons, if the contributory fault of the plaintiff was not greater than the combined 
tortious conduct of all other persons from whom the plaintiff seeks recovery in this action and 
of all other persons from whom the plaintiff does not seek recovery in this action.”  OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (West Supp. 2003).     
128See John Scott Hickman, Efficiency, Fairness, and Common Sense: The Case for One 
Action as to Percentage of Fault in Comparative Negligence Jurisdictions That Have 
Abolished or Modified Joint and Several Liability, 48 VAND. L. REV. 739, 746 (1995).   
129Id. 
130Id. 
131Id. at 742. 
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negligence standard.132  By 1995, forty-six states had adopted a comparative 
negligence standard, which allows plaintiffs to recover damages against defendants 
who are proportionately responsible, even when the plaintiff also contributes to the 
loss.133  Following the adoption of comparative negligence by a small number of 
courts, most state legislatures codified the doctrine during active tort reform 
legislation in the 1980s.134  Many states enacted comparative fault systems but did 
not clearly define how such systems would be integrated in determining damages.135  
One of the issues that arose in adopting comparative fault was whether or not to 
modify or abolish the doctrine of joint and several liability.136  By 1995, state 
legislatures had stepped in, and thirty-four out of the forty-five comparative fault 
states had used legislative action to amend their laws regarding joint and several 
liability.137   
There are various kinds of comparative fault, all of which allow a plaintiff who is 
partially responsible to recover only damages that are appropriately reduced by the 
plaintiff’s own negligence.138  Under a pure form of comparative fault,139 a plaintiff 
can recover damages regardless of the percentage of the loss for which he or she is 
found to be liable, including when his or her fault is found to be more than that of a 
defendant or multiple defendants.140  There are two kinds of modified comparative 
fault systems.  One allows a plaintiff to recover damages only when that plaintiff’s 
fault is less than that of the defendant(s).141  The other allows the plaintiff to recover 
only when that plaintiff’s fault is not greater than that of the defendant(s).142  For 
example, under the first, “less than,” version, a plaintiff can only collect from a 
single defendant if that plaintiff is found to be forty-nine percent or less responsible.  
Under the second “not greater than” version, a plaintiff can only collect if that 
plaintiff is found to be fifty percent or less responsible for his own injuries.  Ohio 
applies the “not greater than” modified standard in which a plaintiff is barred from 
recovery if the factfinder assigns the plaintiff a percentage of responsibility greater 






137Id. at 744.  “[There is] [n]o legislature [that] has reversed a state supreme court decision 
instituting comparative negligence. Rather, the legislatures have stepped in and codified the 
principle in question, allowing for a more efficient and uniform implementation.”  Id. at 743.  
138Cornelius J. Peck, Article: Washington’s Partial Rejection and Modification of the 
Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 237 (1987). 
139The “pure form” here is referring to a kind of comparative fault and is not to be 
confused with a “pure form” of joint and several liability that is discussed throughout the 
Note. They represent two separate and distinct concepts. 
140RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 7 cmt. n and rptrs. 
note to cmt. n (Proposed Final Draft 1999). 
141Id.  
142Id.  
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than that of the defendant.143  For example, if an Ohio jury finds a plaintiff’s 
negligence contributed fifty percent towards his or her own injury, that plaintiff can 
still recover fifty percent of his or her damages from the tortfeasor(s).  However, if a 
plaintiff’s own negligence contributed fifty-one percent or greater, that plaintiff is 
barred from recovery.  
In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply,144 a New Mexico court of appeals 
determined that joint and several liability could not be retained in their state because 
it applied a pure comparative negligence standard.145  Bartlett was an automobile 
accident case involving three vehicles, one of which was being driven by an 
unknown driver.146  Because one of the drivers was unknown, the plaintiff could only 
sue the one known driver for her injuries.147  The jury found the known defendant to 
be only thirty percent responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries and the unknown driver 
to be seventy percent responsible.148  The plaintiff was awarded $100,000 for her 
injuries.149  The court held that in its comparative negligence jurisdiction, a 
concurrent tortfeasor will not be held liable for the entire verdict caused by other 
tortfeasors.150    
The plaintiff in Bartlett gave two reasons why joint and several liability should 
be retained under a comparative negligence system, both of which the court 
rejected.151  The first was that the jury should not be able to apportion damages 
among separate defendants because there is only one wrong, causing one indivisible 
injury.152  The court held that this “unity” concept is obsolete because it is based on 
common law rules of pleading and joinder that no longer exist.153  The second reason 
the plaintiff presented in arguing why joint and several liability should be retained 
was that a plaintiff should not have to bear the risk of not being fully compensated.154  
The court also rejected that argument and stated that, “Between one plaintiff and one 
defendant, the plaintiff bears the risk of the defendant being insolvent; on what basis 
does the risk shift if there are two defendants, and one is in solvent?”155  In other 
                                                                
143The author is personally aware, having professional experience negotiating insurance 
settlements, that this is the type of modified comparative negligence standard used in Ohio. 
144Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, 646 P.2d 579, 586 (N.M. Ct. App. 1892).   
145Id.  The court found that as a concurrent tortfeasor, the defendant would not be held 
liable based on joint and several liability. 




150Id. at 586.  It was not disputed that the defendant and the unknown driver were 
concurrent tortfeasors.  Id. at 581. 
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words, a solvent defendant should not necessarily have to bear the risk when there 
happens to be an insolvent co-defendant.  The court decided that joint and several 
liability could not be retained solely on the premise that the plaintiff should be 
favored over a defendant and, therefore, found the known defendant not responsible 
for the entire verdict that was caused by two separate individuals.156
In Florida, the need for reform in apportionment law was also well illustrated in 
Walt Disney World v. Wood.157  In Disney World, the plaintiff was injured while 
driving a “race car” on a “Grand Prix” attraction when her fiancé rammed into the 
rear of the vehicle that she was driving.158  The jury found the plaintiff fourteen 
percent responsible, her fiancé eighty-five percent responsible and Disney only one 
percent at fault.159  Because of the doctrine of spousal immunity, the plaintiff’s 
husband160 was not required to pay any of the judgment.  Disney was made to pay 
eight-six percent of the verdict, approximately $75,000, after being found only one 
percent responsible.161  Had Ohio’s modified form of joint and several liability been 
applied in Disney World, Disney would have been made to pay one percent of 
plaintiff’s damages,162 representing the percentage the jury held Disney responsible.  
Because Disney’s percentage of liability did not meet the fifty percent threshold, 
joint and several liability would not have be applied for economic or non-economic 
damages.    
Justice McDonald’s convincing dissent in Disney World avowed that the 
doctrines of joint and several liability and comparative negligence are mutually 
inconsistent.163  Due to this conflict, McDonald claimed that in a jurisdiction that 
applies comparative negligence, joint and several liability should not apply because 
each defendant should be held responsible for only the percentage of damages found 
to have been caused by that defendant.164  He reasoned that comparative negligence 
standards enable the court to separate damages in relation to the harm caused and 
that the doctrine of joint and several liability “presumes the inability of the judiciary 
to divide fault among the parties.”165  Thus, the two doctrines cannot appropriately be 
applied together. 
The majority in Disney World laid out the rationale for retaining joint and several 
liability when a comparative fault standard is applied.166  One argument used was 
                                                                
156Id. at 586. 
157See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1987). 
158Id. at 199. 
159Id.  
160By the time that the lawsuit was filed, the plaintiff had married her fiancé.  Id.  
161Id.  
162The word “damages” refers to both economic and non-economic damages.  
163Id. at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
164Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
165Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  Justice McDonald states that, “It would be a 
mismatch of legal concepts to have a separation theory for the plaintiff and a joint liability 
responsibility for the defendants.”  Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
166Id. at 201. 
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that a concurrent tortfeasor must still be held liable for a plaintiff’s whole injury 
when his negligence is a proximate cause of that injury, regardless of the amount of 
liability assessed to him.167  The court opined that merely apportioning fault among 
the parties does not turn an indivisible injury into a “divisible” injury when applying 
joint and several liability, because the negligence of one concurrent tortfeasor may 
be enough to cause the entire loss.168  Justice McDonald confronted this reasoning by 
stating that the old common law theory of a “united cause of action” causing an 
indivisible injury, arose out of ancient pleading and joinder rules that no longer 
present an apportionment dilemma.169  Therefore, the reasons which lie behind the 
inability to apportion fault are no longer present because it is an “illogical fiction” to 
say that fault can be apportioned under a pure comparative fault system, but 
causation cannot.170
A second reason declared by the majority opinion in Disney World in support of 
retaining joint and several liability was that a plaintiff should not be forced to bear a 
portion of his or her damages when a defendant is unable to pay, especially when a 
plaintiff has not contributed to his injury in any way.171  Justice McDonald strongly 
disagreed and could not accept the injustice of shifting the risk to a solvent defendant 
instead of the plaintiff, simply because there are two defendants.172  McDonald 
quotes a Kansas Supreme Court decision, which states:  
There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault 
paying 100% of the loss, and there is no social policy that should compel 
defendants to pay more than their fair share of the loss.  Plaintiffs now 
take the parties as they find them.  If one of the parties at fault happens to 
be a spouse or a governmental agency and if by reason of some competing 
social policy the plaintiff cannot receive payment for his injuries from the 
spouse or the agency, there is no compelling social policy which requires 
the codefendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss.  The same is 
true if one of the defendants is wealthy and the other is not.173  
McDonald also commented that joint and several liability applies to all 
defendants, big and small.174  Because it affects large corporations, small businesses, 
and individuals alike, the defendant is not always in the better position to spread the 
                                                                
167Id. 
168Id. 
169Id. at 204 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).   
170Id. at 205 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
171Id. at 201. 
172Id. at 205.  (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  McDonald could not accept any social policy 
argument for Disney to have to pay one-hundred percent of the damage award just because the 
plaintiff chose to marry the other tortfeasor, whom the jury found to be eighty-six percent 
more at fault than Disney.  Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
173Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 
1978)).  
174Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
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cost of an insolvent codefendant.175  He declared that the plaintiff necessarily bears 
the risk of a defendant not being able to pay, not a defendant.176   
In the end, the Disney court could not say with certainty that joint and several 
liability should be abolished when a comparative negligence standard is applied, and 
held that in light of the public policy considerations surrounding the issues, this 
decision would best be left up to the legislature.177  McDonald’s powerful dissent 
however, demanded that when a plaintiff is found partially responsible for his own 
injuries, joint and several liability should be abrogated.178  McDonald’s viewpoint is 
in accord with the comparative fault doctrine in that each defendant should only be 
held responsible for the amount that he or she is found liable.179  Therefore, the 
arguments that McDonald uses in support of total abolition of joint and several 
liability are equally valid in supporting the abrogation of joint and several liability 
being applied to non-economic damages in Ohio’s modified form.  
The concept behind joint and several liability is that there is a “unitary cause” of 
action and no apportionment of liability among defendants is necessary.180  One of 
the original goals in applying joint and several liability was to assure that, for at least 
economic loss, the plaintiff would be made whole.181  Therefore, Ohio’s 
apportionment requirement in negligence cases does not fit squarely with any form 
of joint and several liability.182  “Joint and several liability, where comparative 
assessments of fault have been made, contravenes the jury’s assessment of damages 
by permitting a shifting of that assessment to the solvent party.”183  The Church court 
agreed that comparative negligence principles and the doctrine of joint and several 
liability cannot be applied together. It states:  
The main principle of comparative negligence is that it is fair to divide 
damages between the parties who are at fault based on each party’s degree 
of fault. . . . The theory which underlies the comparative negligence 
statute is the same theory upon with the statute abolishing joint and 
several liability is based.  It is not so much that the statutes are consistent 
that is important, as it is the fact that abandonment of the concept of 
indivisible injury paved the way for the abolition of joint and several 
liability.184
                                                                
175Id. at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
176Id. (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
177Id. at 202. 
178Id. at 206 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  
179Id. at 202 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).  




184Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., No. 1 CA-CV 90-0357, 1992 Ariz. App. LEXIS 
276, at *350 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1992).  One Ohio scholar also contends:  
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Competing objectives of wanting defendants to be held liable only for their 
proportionate share of total fault in which they contributed versus wanting injured 
plaintiffs to be awarded full compensation at any cost has been the driving force 
behind the controversy surrounding whether to retain joint and several liability in a 
comparative negligence world.185  Because these “competing goals represent 
conflicting values,”186 it is almost impossible to satisfy both objectives in any given 
system.187  Abolishing joint and several liability, for both economic and non-
economic damages, appears to be the most consistent solution in adhering to the 
purpose and goals that underlie a comparative fault system.  However, situations will 
arise in which a strong and appropriate arguments to retain joint and several liability 
will surely surface.188  Ohio’s modified joint and several liability laws present a fair 
and reasonable compromise to these competing interests and will withstand future 
challenges. 
B.  Joint and Several Liability in a Growing Economy and “Sue Happy” Society 
It is apparent to most observers that our society has, in recent years, become 
increasingly litigious.  A jurisdiction that applies joint and several liability, 
especially in its pure form, creates a legal environment, which arguably encourages 
litigants to file more frivolous lawsuits in hopes of establishing even a small 
percentage of liability against a ‘deep pocket’ defendant.  The cost of tort liability 
has risen dramatically in the past three decades.189  The continuous increase in 
                                                          
Both doctrines serve valid objectives.  Their merger, however, presents a serious 
constitutional issue, which mandates the abolition of joint and several liability.  There 
is no recognition of this potential in any reported Ohio decision.  Decisions which 
have permitted joint and several liability to increase the payment made by a defendant, 
without regard to the jury finding of that defendant’s actual contribution to the harm, 
have generally focused on the need to protect victims and left the rights of 
contribution to be fought among the defendants.  Many courts have determined that 
these doctrines are compatible and have upheld increased financial liability.  Their 
decisions err in three respects:  They ignore history, their logic is wrong, and they fail 
to recognize the magnitude of the harm done to the right to try by jury.  This is a 
situation in which the sum of two good parts yields a negative result serving largely to 
impose an unfair burden on solvent defendants. 
Werber, supra note 58, at 1189-90.   
185Hickman, supra note 128, at 744.  
186Id.  
187Id.  
188For example, when a severely injured plaintiff, who has not contributed to his or her 
injury, is unable to collect non-economic damages because the more culpable defendant is 
insolvent and the other defendants’ liability do not exceed the threshold necessary for joint and 
several liability to kick in.  
189George N. Meros, Jr., Article: Toward a More Just and Predictable Civil Justice 
System, 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 141, 143 (1998).  This article noted a survey which showed that 
“Florida’s small businesses—the economic engine of the state—are significantly intimidated 
by the mere threat of liability . . . [and that] the concern is so acute that Florida businesses 
would rather be subject to a tax audit or OSHA inspection than a liability suit.”  Id.  In 
addition, the survey also showed that close to 200 Florida businesses indicated that “they have 
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litigation costs, coupled with unpredictable outcomes of civil litigation, has become 
increasingly detrimental to American commerce.190  For example, due to businesses’ 
fears of exposure to high cost litigation, manufacturers are more hesitant and allow 
research and innovation to suffer in an attempt to assure the highest possible level of 
product uniformity.191  In addition, products that serve a social good have either not 
been under developed or withdrawn from the market.192  In turn, these effects have 
“deterred commercial innovation, and stifled economic productivity.”193
The President and CEO of the Ohio Chamber of Commerce has commented on 
the advantages of Ohio’s new joint and several liability laws and suggested that 
under the old law the “business climate” in Ohio was adversely affected because of 
an unpredictable and unfair civil justice system. 194  He referred to studies showing 
that almost three out of every five small Ohio businesses had been involved in, or 
threatened by, at least one lawsuit.195  He also reported that the combined cost of 
frivolous lawsuit filings is somewhere between $1,200 and $1,500 per Ohioan, per 
year, and a civil liability lawsuit is filed in Ohio once every seventeen minutes.196  
One source proposed that lawsuit abuse in Ohio has an impact on the citizens of the 
state and “threatens the state’s economic competitiveness.”197  Joint and several 
liability negatively affects municipalities, but poses the same threat to private 
individuals and not-for-profit companies alike.198
Returning to a pure form of joint and several liability would only perpetuate 
abusive litigation practices by encouraging plaintiffs to file “shotgun” lawsuits aimed 
at collecting full damages from any defendant with deep pockets, regardless of that 
                                                          
withheld, failed to develop, or refused to market products or services to limit exposure to 
liability suits.”  Id. at 144. 
190Id. at 143.  The assistant general counsel to the U.S. Steel Corporation recently reported 
that under Ohio’s previous pure form of joint and several liability, his company was defending 
in excess of 2,500 claims that were subject to the “incredibly illogical and unfair doctrine [of 
joint and several liability].”  Regarding Apportionment of Liability in Civil Actions. Second 
Hearing on SB 120 Before the House Civil & Commercial Law Committee (2002) (statement 
of Richard Lerach, assistant general counsel, U.S. Steel Corporation), at 





194Andy Doehrel, Testimony and Letters-Proponent Testimony on SB 120 Before the 
House Civil & Commercial Law Committee (2002), at http://www.ohiochamber.com/ 
governmental/testimonySB120.asp (last visited October 2003). 
195General Facts, at http://www.omunileague.org/ohio_alliance_for_civil_justice.htm (last 
visited October 2003).  
196Id. 
197Id.   
198THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 87 (Walter 
Olson ed., 1988. 
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particular defendant’s degree of fault.199  This increase in lawsuit filings would 
increase the cost of litigation for every citizen.  Fostering this type of legal 
environment would eventually backfire against Ohioans by chilling efforts to 
continue commercial growth, especially for smaller businesses, which tend to be 
most vulnerable.200  Ohio’s new joint and several liability laws require that plaintiff 
attorneys conduct more thorough investigations in determining precisely who is 
culpable.201  More thorough investigations should lower the number of lawsuits filed 
for the sole purpose of nailing down at least one solvent defendant.  These “off-the-
cuff” lawsuits exert only undue pressure on the defendant and his or her insurance 
company to settle quickly in order to avoid being exposed to the entire verdict.202
The insurance industry is opposed to applying joint and several liability and has 
been outspoken in its criticism.203  Industry leaders claim that the doctrine makes 
insurance companies a “magnet for liability,” while at the same time, making it 
extremely difficult for insurance companies to predict their degree of liability risk 
exposure.204  Predicting the magnitude of a given policyholder’s “joint and several” 
liability is very difficult for insurers because determining their exposure involves 
having to factor in whether other parties to a lawsuit are going to be judgment proof 
and whether that insurer is going to have pay for insolvent defendants.205  This makes 
setting premium costs in a jurisdiction with joint and several liability much more 
problematic.  Thus, in applying Ohio’s laws, which partially do away with joint and 
several liability, the scope of this unpredictable exposure is reduced and, therefore, 
insurance carriers are able to set more appropriate premiums for consumers. 
                                                                
199See Doehrel, supra note 194. 
200Id.  One Ohio representative gave proponent testimony for Am. Sub. S.B. 120 and 
stated,  
[T]he civil justice system fosters a cancer in society.  Namely, a litigation frenzy in 
which no one wants to assume individual responsibility. . . .[T]he present [pure form] 
law of joint and several liability defies all sense of fairness and promotes shotgun 
lawsuits.  SB120 will help small businesses, one-fourth of which are being sued or 
threatened with a lawsuit at any given moment, often sued because they have 
insurance. 
Regarding Apportionment of Liability in Civil Actions.  Second Hearing on SB 120 Before the 
Senate Judiciary on Civil Justice (2001) (statement of Roger Geiger, state director of the 
National Federation of Independent Business-Ohio), at http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/ 
oh_ban_124%3ASB120.notes (last visited February 2004). 
201Id. 
202Id. 
203THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 198, at 87.  
204Id. at 63.  
205Id.  Various developments in “tort and insurance law” (including joint and several 
liability) has added “unpredictability to the calculations insurers must make in setting liability-
insurance premiums.”  Id.  “Since the aggregation of predictable risks is the essence of the 
insurance function, it is extremely probable that the market’s instability during the crisis of 
1985 and 1986—and a portion of the premium increases of that time—can be traced to [joint 
and several liability and other tort reform developments].”  Id.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Since the Ohio General Assembly has not evidenced any intent to fully abolish 
joint and several liability, the modified form presents what this author feels to be a 
fair compromise between competing interests.  Just as abolishing joint and several 
liability would leave some plaintiffs without full compensation, returning to the pure 
form would be equally and arguably more unfair and burdensome to defendants 
when they are made to pay a full verdict for which they were only marginally 
responsible.  Although some may argue that inadequacies still exist under the 
modified form, there are actions that potential plaintiffs and defendants can take to 
protect themselves from the vulnerabilities of the proportionate standard.  For 
example, individuals can purchase adequate uninsured motorist coverage, which 
would ensure full compensation to plaintiffs injured in auto accidents where the 
tortfeasor is uninsured or underinsured.  Also, businesses and insurance companies 
can take a more active approach in the area of risk analysis and underwriting 
insurance policies to assure adequate coverage for defendants in situations where 
joint and several liability is triggered for a plaintiff’s economic damages.206
In reviewing constitutional attacks to other tort reform measures, it is evident that 
the modified form of joint and several liability is a fair and constitutionally sound 
compromise.  The new law allows plaintiffs to recover one hundred percent of their 
economic loss from a culpable defendant who contributed to at least fifty one percent 
of their injury, while shielding collectable defendants from having to “pick up the 
tab” for other culpable defendants who are unable to pay their portion of non-
economic damages.   
This proportionate standard is an appropriate resolution to the clash of competing 
interests between the General Assembly’s objective of reforming Ohio’s tort laws 
and the Plaintiff Bar’s efforts to maximize their client’s potential to collect a full 
verdict.  Thirty-four states have either abolished or modified joint and several 
liability, and an additional four states have never adopted it.207  In upholding the 
modified joint and several liability laws, Ohio lawmakers and judges are 
demonstrating their belief in the need for and the importance of a fair and balanced 
tort system.208   
                                                                
206Shortly after the enactment of Am. Sub. S.B. 120, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003), 
The Ohio Department of Insurance (ODI) issued guidelines to Ohio insurers regarding the 
impact of Ohio’s new modified form of joint and several liability on future medical 
malpractice premiums.  Insurance Department Issues Med/Mal Guidelines, HANNAH NEWS 
SERVICE, Apr. 25, 2003, available at http/www.ohcapcon.com/ipc/ipc.htm?/hanart/ 
20030425_HANNAH_4.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).  “ODI informed insurers that it 
expects the provisions to be immediately incorporated into rate filings and supporting 
documents.  Compliance with the guidelines should help lower premiums for Ohio 
physicians.”  Id.  The ODI is now requiring that all licensed insurers provide an overall rate 
analyses and show how an overall rate change is consistent with that analysis and must explain 
any expected changes in underwriting.  Id.  ODI concluded that modifying joint and several 
liability in Ohio will have an impact on medical malpractice rates.  Id.  
207Policy Facts-Tort Reform Joint and Several Liability 124th General Assembly, 
http://www.ohiochamber.com/governmental/tortreform.asp (last visited October 2003).  
208According to one Ohio Senator, adopting the modified joint and several liability is “a 
rational common-sense approach to balancing the scales of justice.”  Regarding 
Apportionment of Liability in Civil Actions.  First Hearing on SB 120 Before the Senate 
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Judiciary on Civil Justice (2001) (statement of B. Johnson, Senator), at 
http://han2.hannah.com/htbin/f.com/oh_ ban_124%3ASB120.notes (last visited February 
2004). 
209Expected J.D., December 2006.  I would like to thank the Cleveland State Law Review 
for its continued support throughout the writing process and for pushing me to a higher level 
of legal education. 
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